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Religion, Establishment, and the
Northwest Ordinance: A Closer Look
at an Accommodationist Argument
BY THOMAS NATHAN PETERS*
cholarly interpreters of the Establishment Clause fall generally
into two camps: separationists who claim the Establishment
Clause bars the federal government from legislating religion' and
accommodationists who claim the Establishment Clause bars only the
preferential treatment of religious groups.2 While scholars in both camps
J.D. expected 2002, University of Kentucky. The author is indebted to the
work of Jim Allison and Susan Batte, independent researchers who have spent
countless hours studying primary source documents related to religious liberty in
America. The author at one time participated with Allison and Batte in a
collaborative web page dealing with religious liberty issues. Most of the arguments
in this Note originate from that collaboration. This Note reworks, expands, and
documents these arguments in a manner appropriate to legal scholarship. Allison
and Batte's current work can be found at Jim Allison & Susan Batte, The
ConstitutionalPrinciple: Separation ofChurch andStateathttp://members.tripod.
com/-candst/ (Jan. 31,2001).
1 Leading separationist studies include THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST
FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT(1986); DEREKDAVIS,ORIGINALINTENT: CHIEFJUSTICEREHNQUIST
AND THE COURSE OF AMERICAN CHURCH/STATE RELATIONS (1991); LEONARDW.
LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2d
ed. 1994); LEOPFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, ANDFREEDOM (rev. ed., 1967); Douglas
Laycock, "Nonpreferential"Aidto Religion:A False ClaimAbout Original Intent,
27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875 (1986) [hereinafter Laycock, "Nonpreferential"
Aid]; Douglas Laycock, Text, Intent, and theReligion Clauses, 4 NOTREDAMEJ.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 683 (1990); Douglas Laycock, Original Intent and the
Constitution Today, in THE FIRST FREEDOM: RELIGION AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS
87 (James E. Wood, Jr. ed., 1990).
1 Leading accommodationist studies include ARLIN K. ADAMS & CHARLES J.
EMMERICH,ANATION DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
HERITAGE OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES (1990); WALTER BERNS, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1970); GERARD V.
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make appeals to the text and legislative history of the Establishment
Clause,3 much of the accommodationist argument is focused on the claim
that, in the decades following the adoption of the Constitution, the federal
government acted inconsistently with the separationist understanding of the
First Amendment. Examples of such supposed accommodation include the
establishment of chaplains for Congress4 and the military,5 presidential
declarations of days of prayer and Thanksgiving,6 land grants to Christian
missionaries working in the Indian territories,7 and, notably, certain
provisions of the Land Ordinance of 1787, more commonly known as the
Northwest Ordinance.8
Enacted by the last Congress to sit under the Articles of Confedera-
tion, the Northwest Ordinance created a temporary government for the
Northwest Territory, a vast swath of land extending from the Great Lakes
to the Ohio River ceded to the federal government by the states at the
end of the Revolutionary War.' As the first "constitution" for the Terri-
BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS INAMERICA (1987); ROBERTL. CORD,
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION
(1982); DANIEL L. DREISBACH, REAL THREAT AND MERE SHADOW: RELIGIOUS
LIBERTYANDTHEFIRSTAMENDMENT (1987); MICHAEL J.MALBIN,RELGIONAND
POLITICS: THE INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1978);
JAMESM. O'NEILL, RELIGIONAND EDUCATION UNDERTHE CONSTTUTION (1949);
RODNEY K. SMITH, PUBLIC PRAYER AND THE CONSTITUTION: A CASE STUDY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1987); Michael W. McConnell, Accommo-
dation ofReligion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The
Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 933 (1986).
3 For separationists see LEVY, supra note 1, at ch. 5; Laycock, "Nonprefer-
ential " Aid, supra note 1, at 877-94. For accommodationists see BRADLEY, supra
note 2, ch. 4; CORD, supra note 2, at 7-12; MALBIN, supra note 2, at 1-13.
4 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 242 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
5 CORD, supra note 2, at 54.
6Id. at 51-53.
7 Id. at 57-80.
8 Act to Provide for the Government of the Territory North-west of the River
Ohio, Ch.8, 1 Stat. 50, 51 n.(a) (1789). This reference reproduces the Northwest
Ordinance as a three page footnote to a 1789 statute that conforms the Ordinance
to the recently ratified Constitution. See infra Part I.
9 Important discussions of the genesis, provisions, and effect of the Ordinance
can be found in JAYA. BARRET, EvOLuION OF THE ORDINANCE OF 1787 (1891);
THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE: ESSAYS ON ITS FORMULATION, PROvISIONS, AND
LEGACY (Frederick D. William; ed., 1989); PETER S. ONUF, STATEHOOD AND
UNION: AHISTORYOFTHENORTHWESTORDINANCE (1987); HOWARD CROMWELL
TAYLOR, THE EDUCATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EARLY FEDERAL LAND
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tory,10 the Ordinance is famous for its guarantees of religious" and civil 2
liberties, its promotion of goodwill toward Native Americans," and its
prohibition of slavery. 4 Equally famous is the Ordinance's framework for
territorial self-government'5 and its mechanisms for dividing the territory
into states and providing for their admission into the Union. 6 The
ORDINANCES (1922).
'
0Denis P. Duffey, The Northwest Ordinance as a ConstitutionalDocument, 95
COLUM. L. REv. 929, 931-33 (1995). Professor Denis Duffey argues that the
Northwest Ordinance was more than justaconstitution for the NorthwestTerritory.
Duffey sees the Ordinance as an authoritative expression of the guiding principles
of American governance and so ranks the Ordinance alongside The Federalist
Papers and the Declaration of Independence as a "constitutional" document with
"quasi-constitutional" status. Id. at 931-33. According to Duffey constitutional
documents have an "authority of an extraordinary, foundational character" and
"express[ ] principles that guide the actions of a political entity." Id. at 933.
" Article I of the Ordinance provided that "[n]o person, demeaning himself in
a peaceable and orderly manner, shall ever be molested on account of his mode of
worship or religious sentiments." 1 Stat. at 52 n.(a).
' Article II of the Ordinance provided for a writ of habeas corpus, trial by jury,
and proportionate representation inthe legislature, and prohibited cruel and unusual
punishment and required Congress to reimburse residents for takings of personal
property. Id.
13 Article III of the Ordinance provided that "[t]he utmost good faith shall
always be observed toward the Indians," and that "laws founded in justice and
humanity shall from time to time be made, for preventing wrongs being done to
[Native Americans]." Id.
14 Article VI of the Ordinance provided that "[tihere shall be neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude in the said territory, otherwise than in punishment of crimes."
1 Stat. at 53 n.(a).
15 The body of the Ordinance provided that, "[slo soon as there shall be five
thousand free male inhabitants, of full age, in the district... they shall receive
authority, with time and place, to elect representatives from their counties or
townships, to represent them in the general assembly" to "consist of a governor,
legislative council, and a house of representatives." The house of representatives
was freely elected. The governor was appointed by Congress, and candidates for
the legislative council were nominated by the house of representatives and
approved by Congress. Id. at 51-52 n.(a).
6 Article V of the Ordinance authorized the creation of"not less than three, nor
more than five States" from the Northwest Territory, and provided that when:
any of the said States shall have sixty thousand free inhabitants therein,
such State shall be admitted, by its delegates, into the Congress of the
United States, on an equal footing with the original States, in all respects
whatever, and shall be at liberty to form a permanent constitution and State
2000-2001]
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significance of the Ordinance for accommodationists, however, lies not in
these provisions, but in the first sentence of its third "article of compact"
between the citizens of the Territory and the states, 7 which reads:
"Religion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good government
and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall
forever be encouraged."'"
Accommodationists make two arguments that the "religion, morality,
and knowledge" clause ("RMK" clause) is inconsistentwith separationism.
First, accommodationists argue that, in positioning religion as the first of
three justifications for widespread education, the clause commits the
federal government to a policy of encouraging religion in the territorial
schools. 9 Indeed, one accommodationist writer has gone so far as to claim
that the Ordinance required schools to teach religion.20 Second,
accommodationists note that shortly after the Ordinance was enacted-and
seemingly in keeping with the RMK clause-Congress sold two large tracts
of territorial land with the stipulation that section twenty-nine of each
township be reserved for the support of religion.2" Accommodationists
government: [p]rovided the constitution and government so to be formed,
shall be republican ....
1 Stat. at 53 n.(a). These provisions ultimately created the states ofIllinois, Indiana,
Ohio, Michigan, and Wisconsin. NORTHWEST TERRITORY CELEBRATION
COMMISSION, HISTORY OF THE ORDINANCE OF 1787 AND THE OLD NORTHWEST
TERRITORY 66-74 (1937). Additionally, a small section of the Territory became
part of the state of Minnesota. Id. at 74.
The Ordinance's legacy of state-creation extends far beyond the Northwest
Territory. So successful was the Ordinance at dealing with the exigencies of
territorial land administration that its provisions were frequently extended to new
territories as they were created by Congress, and so "set the pattern of territorial
governance and statemaking that was ultimately applied to thirty-one of the fifty
states." Duffey, supra note 10, at 930. Elsewhere Duffey refers to the Ordinance
as the "foundational document of American expansionism." Id. at 949. For an
authoritative discussion of the role of the Ordinance in the history of American
expansionism, see JACK ERICSON EBLEN, THEFIRSTAND SECOND UNITED STATES
EMPIRES: GOvERNORs AND TERRTroRIAL GOVERNMENT, 1784-1912 (1968).
17 The body of the Ordinance was followed by six articles, designated as
"articles of compact between the original States, and the people and States in the
said territory" thatwere declared to "forever remain unalterable, unless by common
consent." 1 Stat. at 52 n.(a).
Id.
'
9 See infra Part I.
20 DAVID BARTON, THE MYTH OF SEPARATION 39 (1992).
21 See BRADLEY, supra note 2, at 99.
[VOL. 89
THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE
argue that these set asides amounted to direct federal aid to religion and
would not have been approved by a Congress concerned with maintaining
a wall of separation between church and state.' For the purposes of this
Note, the text of the RMK clause and the religious set aside provisions of
the 1787 land sales are termed "substantive" arguments that the Ordinance
is inconsistent with separationism.
Accommodationists are aware that neither substantive argument
establishes a direct conflict with separationist readings of the First
Amendment. The Ordinance and the land sales were approved while
Congress was still operating under the Articles of Confederation and,
hence, were governed neither by the Constitution nor the restrictions of the
Establishment Clause?' To remove this difficulty, accommodationists
advance the corollary argument that the Northwest Ordinance was
"reenacted" by the same Congress that framed the text of the First
Amendment.24 Reasoning that Congress would not approve legislation that
aided religion while atthe same time framing an amendment that prohibited
such aid, accommodationists conclude that the Establishment Clause could
not have been intended as an outright ban on support for religion.'
Together, the substantive and corollary arguments comprise the core of the
accommodationist claim that the Northwest Ordinance evidences an
accommodationist intent for the Establishment Clause.
Despite the frequency with which the Northwest Ordinance is
invoked in discussions of the religion clauses of the First Amendment,
few scholars on either side of the debate have paid much attention to
the grammar and legislative history of the Ordinance, or the logi-
cal difficulties involved in using legislation passed under the Arti-
cles of Confederation to prove something about the Constitution.
Among accommodationists only John Baker,26 David Barton,27 Gerard
22See id. at 101.
I Congress operated under the Articles of Confederation between 1778 and
1789. ALFREDH. KELLY ETAL., 1 THEAMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND
DEVELOPMENT 78, 94-95 (7th ed. 1991).
See SMITH,supra note 2, at 105,211. As suggested later inthisNote, the term
"reenact' is not a good description of the actions of the First Congress. See infra
note 189.
' See SMITH, supra note 2, at 105, 211.
26 John S. Baker, Jr., The Establishment Clause as Intended: No Preference
Among Sects and Pluralism in a Large Commercial Republic, in THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENTUNDERSTANDING 48-50 (Eugene W.
Hickok, Jr. ed., 1991).27BARTON, supra note 20, at 37-39.
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Bradley,28 and Robert Cord29 devote more than a few sentences to the
Ordinance. Among separationists only Derek Davis" addresses the
Ordinance in detail. This Note proposes to remedy this lacuna by providing
a more thorough examination of the substantive and corollary arguments
than have heretofore been provided in the relevant literature. This Note
concludes that many of the claims accommodationists make about the
Northwest Ordinance are poorly grounded in fact and that the Ordinance
may actually undercut some of the assumptions upon which
accommodationists depend to frame their arguments in other contexts. -
Part I of this Note examines the RMK clause and the religious
-reservation provisions of the first two land sales under the Northwest
Ordinance and concludes that neither presents a clear substantive challenge
to separationism.3' Part II examines the legislative history of the "reenact-
ment" of the Ordinance by the Congress that framed the text of the First
Amendment and concludes there are insuperable chronological difficulties
in using the Ordinance to say anything meaningful about the Establishment
Clause. 2
I. THE SUBSTANTIVE ARGUMENTS
A. The "Religion, Morality, and Knowledge" Clause
The claim that the RMK clause committed the federal government to
the support of religion dates at least from Isaac Cornelison's pioneering
1895 work on religion and civil government.33 Nevertheless, the claim
played no part in the Supreme Court's analysis of the religion clauses until
8 BRADLEY, supra note 2, at 98-104.
29CORD, supra note 2, at 61-63.
30DAVIS, supra note 1, at 141-44. See also DEREKH.DAVIS,RELIGIONANDTHE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS: 1774-1789, at 168-72 (2000) [hereinafter DAVIS,
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS].3 1 See infra Part I.
32 See infra Part II.
3 3 IsAAc A. CORNELISON, THE RELATION OF RELIGION TO CIVIL GOVERNMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 111-20 (Da Capo Press 1970) (1895).
Cornelison claimed that the United States was "bound by the compact of 1787 to
promote 'religion, morality, and knowledge,"' and that "there can be no doubt that
the religion which it was under obligation to promote was the Christian religion."
Id. at 120. In making these claims Cornelison goes beyond the position of most
modem accommodationists who argue that, whatever type of accommodation is
permitted by the First Amendment, it cannot favor a single religion.
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1985, when Justice Rehnquist cited the clause in his dissenting opinion in
Wallace v. Jaffree 4 Modem accommodationists have produced several
versions of the argument, ranging from the flat assertion that the clause
required territorial schools to teach religion" to the less extreme claim that
the clause amounted to an official sanctioning of the "benevolent promo-
tion by the state of religious education."'36 All of these claims hinge on the
fact that the clause positions religion as the first of several justifications for
the encouragement of education.
This section argues that accommodationists go beyond the evidence in
claiming that the RMK clause committed the federal government to the
support of religion. In fact, the clause neither required schools to teach
religion, nor bound the federal or state governments to any policy toward
territorial schools. Rather, the clause is better understood as a prescient but
legally unenforceable expression of sentiment toward the encouragement
of public education. Additionally, this section argues that the language of
the RMK clause and the legislative history of the Ordinance suggest that
Congress did not intend the clause to authorize direct support for religion.
1. The RMK Clause Did Not Require Schools to Teach Religion
The most interesting accommodationist claim about the meaning of the
R2MK clause is David Barton's assertion that the clause required territorial
schools to teach religion.37 In a popular 1991 book, Barton recites the text
of the RMK clause,38 and notes that the Northwest Ordinance was
reauthorized by the same Congress that framed the text of the First
Amendment 9 He concludes that, "[s]ince the same Congress which
prohibited the federal government from the 'establishment of religion' also
requiredthatreligion be included in schools, the Framers [ofthe Establish-
ment Clause] obviously did not view a federal requirement to teach religion
in schools as a violation of the First Amendment." Additionally, Barton
notes that language modeled after the RMK clause was inserted by
34 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 100 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see
Baker, supra note 26, at 48.
35 BARTON, supra note 20, at 39.
36 CHARLES E. RICE, THE SUPREMECOURTANDPUBLICPRAYER: THENEEDFOR
RESTRAINT 31 (1964).
37 BARTON, supra note 20, at 39.
38 1 d. at 38.
39Id. at37.
40 Id. at 39 (emphasis added).
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Congress into the legislative acts creating various states after the enactment
of the Northwest Ordinance4 and later concludes-possibly on the basis of
this evidence-that the Ordinance made the teaching of religion in schools
a "prerequisite for statehood in the United States." 2 These are strong
claims, and they go well beyond the conclusions of most other
accommodationist scholars4 Nevertheless, responding to these arguments
disposes of a number of issues related to the purpose of the Ordinance and
its actual effect on education in the Northwest Territory.
Barton's arguments are vulnerable to attack on multiple linguistic and
historical grounds. First, assuming arguendo that the RMK clause was
intended to bind Congress to a policy of encouraging education, Barton
exaggerates the scope of the power the clause conferred upon Congress to
regulate schools. A provision allowing "encouragement" of education is not
the same as a provision authorizing the federal government to prescribe
curricula or subject matter. Nothing in the wording of the Ordinance
conferred power on the federal government to regulate education, nor did
it remove such power from territorial governments. Note also that Barton
provides no evidence from contemporary sources that the Ordinance was
understood to have required such federal regulation. Second, while Barton
is correct that the clause assumes that "schools and educational systems
[are a] proper means to encourage 'religion, morality, and knowledge,',
41 Id. at 38-39.
421 Id. at 130. Barton certainly does not reach this conclusion on the basis of
HENRY STEELE COMMAGER, DOCuMENTs OFAMERICANHISTORY 131 (1948), the
source he cites in the footnote to this statement. The footnote points to a reprint of
a portion ofthe Northwest Ordinance, butnothing in the language reproduced there
requires states to teach religion as a prerequisite for admission to the Union. It is
possible that Barton is misreading the language of Article IV of the Ordinance, also
reprinted on that page, which requires states formed from the Northwest Territory
to obey acts of Congress.
' It is worth noting that Barton is neither an historian nor a scholar in the
traditional sense of those terms. A former school principal with no advanced degree
in any discipline, Barton left the world of education to found Wall Builders, a
national organization dedicated to restoring what Barton sees as the moral and
religious foundations of American government. See David Barton, David
Barton/Wallbuilders: PartialResume, at http://www.wallbuilders.com/resume.html
(last visited Feb. 18,2001). Critics argue that Barton is often less than honest in his
use of historical data. See infra note 63. Nevertheless, his books are extremely
influential among religious conservatives and deserve to be taken seriously by
mainstream scholars.
" BARTON, supra note 20, at 38.
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it does not follow from this that such encouragement required schools to
teach religion. The framers of the Ordinance may have linked religion to
education on the more general ground that educated people are simply more
likely to be religious, moral, and knowledgeable than uneducated people.4
Third, while the Ordinance may have viewed religion as one of the
components "necessary to good government and the happiness of man-
kind," only "schools and the means of education" were actually encour-
aged.' The absence of the word "religion" from the "encouragement"
clause is conspicuous in the face of its presence only one clause earlier. It
suggests that the framers were consciously distinguishing between religion
and education; while religion might be important to good government, only
education was actually encouraged.47 That Barton's argument ignores this
distinction does nothing to increase its probability.
Fourth, historians are unanimous that the RMK clause did not formally
commit the federal government to any policy toward schooling in the
Northwest Territory. While it is accurate to understand the RMK language
of the Northwest Ordinance as a prophetic statement of the importance of
public education," the terms of the Ordinance did not themselves establish
a school system for the Old Northwes 9 or require territorial schools to
conform to federal regulation. 0 The Ordinance built no schools, appropri-
ated no money, prescribed no curriculum, nor required territorial govern-
ments to provide any of the elements of a school system. Moreover, and
unlike previous land ordinances, it did not require that land be set aside for
45This is the interpretation given to the clause whenever it was interpreted by
courts operating under state constitutions that incorporated RMK language. See
infra notes 66-104 and accompanying text
"I Act to Provide for the Government of the Territory North-west of the River
Ohio, Ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50,52 n.(a) (1789).
47Note thatthe Continental Congress considered RMK language allowing direct
support for religion and rejected it. See infra notes 135-42 and accompanying text.48 Article TIT of the Ordinance has been referred to as both the "charter of the
public school system of the great Middle and Far West," PAUL MONROE,
FOUNDING OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM 196 (1940), and "the
cornerstone in the foundation of the free public school system which... made
possible the development of an educated and useful citizenship in a rapidly
growing and expanding democratic society." TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 53. Both
statements are facial exaggerations of the immediate influence of the Ordinance,
as Taylor himself confirms. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.49
,SeeR.CARLYLEBULEY,THEOLDNORTHWEST:PIONEERPERIOD, 1815-1840,
at 326 (1951).50TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 82-83.
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the support of education.5 Nor did it require territorial governments to
create such set asides 2 Rather, reserved land for education was first
secured for territorial residents through Congressional land sales to private
land speculators, the terms of which were unconnected to the provisions of
the Northwest Ordinance.53
Similarly, when historians unpack the educational significance of the
Ordinance they are careful to distinguish between the rhetoric of the RMK
clause and its actual effect on territorial education. In reality, the Ordinance
played no role in the development of federal education policy in the
territory "except in that it established a form of territorial government
which led to the rapid settlement of the unoccupied lands and thereby made
effective and useful... land grants for public education."' Accordingly,
historians have described the RMK clause as "merely an expression of
sentiment, a gesture of approval of something which seemed desirable," '55
"more pious preachment than mandate,"'56 and as "a pious pronouncement
that doubtless had a great moral value, but.., did nothing toward the
support of schools."'57 Other scholars observe that the Ordinance "had very
11 The Northwest Ordinance replaced Jefferson's Ordinance of 1784, Con-
gress's first attempt to provide for governance in the territory. MAXFARRAND, THE
LEGISLATION OF CONGRESS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ORGANIZED
TERRITORIES OFTHEUNTED STATES: 1789-1895, at 7-8 (1896). At the time of the
enactment of the Northwest Ordinance, disposal of land in the Northwest Territory
was governed by the Ordinance of 1785, which replaced Jefferson's proposed Land
Ordinance of 1784, an entirely different statute than the Ordinance of 1784. RoY
M. ROBBINS, OUR LANDED HERITAGE: THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, 1776-1970, at 7-8
(1942). The 1785 Ordinance created a system of land surveys to divide the
Northwest Territory into townships. The terms of the Ordinance required section
16 of each township to be reserved for the support of education. BENJAMIN
HORACE HIBBARD, A HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC LAND POLICIES 37-38 (1967). The
Northwest Ordinance had no corresponding provisions relating to the disposal of
land.52 See NEWTON EDWARDS & HERMAN G. RICHEY, THE SCHOOL IN THE AMER-
ICAN SOCIAL ORDER 216 (2d ed. 1963).53 TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 41; infra notes 160-65 and accompanying text.
5 TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 41.
55 BULEY, supra note 49, at 326.
"6 HAROLD M. HYMAN, AMERICAN SINGULARITY: THE 1787 NORTHWEST
ORDINANCE, THE 1862 HOMESTEAD AND MORRILL ACTS, AND THE 1944 G.I. BILL
25 (1986).
57 WILLIAM M. FRENCH, AMERICA'S EDUCATIONAL TRADITION: AN INTER-
PRETivE HISTORY 48 (1964).
[VOL. 89
THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE
little effect on the actual support of schools,"' that it "failed to place the
responsibility for education upon the government,"'9 and conclude that it
"provided scarcely any direction whatsoever" to territorial legislatures.60 As
one eminent historian of the Ordinance summarized, "education was a
minor consideration in the Ordinance of 1787 and.., no special credit is
due those responsible for the passage of this ordinance because its
provision for the encouragement of schools was later used effectively as an
argument for land grants for education. 1 While none of this is intended to
downplay the significance of the Ordinance either asthe first expression of
federal support for public education, or as a vehicle for encouraging land
sales in the Old Northwest,62 it does suggest how far Barton's claims about
the RMK clause are removed from the conclusions of reputable historians.63
As noted earlier, Barton makes much of the fact that Congress inserted
RMK language into the enabling acts of many states created after the
passage of the Northwest Ordinance." The consequence is that many states
adopted the language into their own constitutions.' This fact does not help
58 CARL F. KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC: COMMON SCHOOLS AND
AMERICAN SOCIETY, 1780-1860, 182-83 (1983).
59 EDWARDS & RICHEY, supra note 52, at 216.
6 Ruth Bloch, Battling Infidelity, Heathenism, and Licentiousness: New
England Missions on the Post-Revolutionary Frontier, 1792-1805, in THE
NORTHWEST ORDINANCE: ESSAYS ON rrs FORMULATION, PROVISIONS ANDLEGACY,
supra note 9, at 39.
61 TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 118.
6The encouragement of land sales was a primary purpose of the Northwest
Ordinance. See id. at 30.
63 This is not the first time Barton has made claims at odds with all known
historical data. In a 1989 videotape Barton attributed Thomas Jefferson's famous
"wall of separation" metaphor to an 1801 speech and claimed that the metaphor
was immediately followed by the words, "[tihe wall is a one-directional wall. It
keeps the government from running the church but it makes sure that Christian
principles will always stay in government." Videotape: America's Godly Heritage
(Wallbuilders 1989) (on file with author). In fact, Jefferson used the wall metaphor
in his 1802 letter to the Danbury Baptists, and the attributed words appear nowhere
in the letter. 16 ANDREW A. Ln'SCOMB & ALBERT E. BERGH, THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 281-82 (1903). This and other examples of Barton's
misstatements can be found in Robert S. Alley, Public Education and the Public
Good, WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 316-18 (1995); Rob Boston, Sects, Lies and
Videotape, CHURCH AND STATE, April 1993, at 80; Rob Boston, When a Myth is
as Good as a Mile, CHURCH AND STATE, April 1993, at 82.
" BARTON, supra note 20, at 38-39.65 1d.
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Barton's case. Whenever early state courts interpreted the Ordinance's
RMK clause, or the RMK language appearing in state constitutions, they
held that the language did not mandate the teaching of religion in schools.
At least three early cases presented the issue squarely, and in each the
courts held against Barton's position. The earliest and most famous of these
cases is Board of Education v. Minor.'
In 1852 the Cincinnati Board of Education adopted a rule requiring that
common school classes begin their day by reading a portion of the King
James Bible "by or under the direction of the teacher, and appropriate
singing by the pupils."'67 The rule allowed dissenting students to read
silently from scriptures other than the King James Bible.6" Some years later
the school board reversed itself and passed two resolutions repealing the
rule and prohibiting religious instruction in the public schools.69 A group
of parents sued for a permanent injunction against enforcement of the
resolutions, which a lower court granted.7" In 1872, the school board
appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court, arguing that Bible reading ran afoul
of the religious freedom provisions of the Ohio Constitution. The parents
responded by arguing that the Ohio Constitution contained the following
language, clearly adapted from Article I of the Northwest Ordinance:
Religion, morality, and knowledge... being essential to good govern-
ment, it shall be the duty of the general assembly to pass suitable laws to
protect every religious denomination in the peaceable enjoyment of its
own mode of public worship, and to encourage schools and the means of
instruction. ' 7'
Despite this language, the Court refused to read the Ohio Constitution to
allow religious instruction in the schools:
The three things so declared to be essential to good government are
'religion, morality, and knowledge.' These three words stand in the same
category, and in the same relation to the context; and if one of them is used
66Bd. of Educ. v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211 (1872).
671d. at 211-12.
6 Id. at 212.
691d. at 211.
70 Id. at 215.
711d. at241. While the Northwest Ordinance also contained language protecting
freedom of religion, the Ohio Constitution inserted this language into the middle
of its RMK clause. Nothing in the Court's opinion, however, suggests that the
insertion affected its reading of the clause.
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in its generic or unlimited sense, so are all three.... The last named of
these three words, 'knowledge,' comprehends in itself all that is compre-
hended in the other two words, 'religion' and 'morality,' and which can be
the subject of human 'instruction.' .. .The fair interpretation seems to be,
that true 'religion' and 'morality' are aided and promoted by the increase
and diffusion of 'knowledge,' on the theory that 'knowledge is the hand-
maid ofvirtue,' and that all three-religion, morality, and knowledge-are.
essential to good government 2
Additionally, the court noted that "[tihe real claim here is, that by 'reli-
gion,' in this clause of the constitution, is meant 'Christian religion,' and
that by 'religious denomination' in the same clause is meant 'Christian
denomination.' ,T The consequence of so interpreting the clause, argued
the court, "would be to withdraw from every person not of Christian belief
the guaranties therein vouchsafed, and to withdraw many of them from
Christians themselves." 4 Finally, the court argued thatthe city's interpreta-
tion of the Ohio RMK clause reversed the clause's stated roles for religion
and government:
The declaration is, not that government is essential to good religion, but
that religion is essential to good government... [R]eligion, morality, and
knowledge are essential to government, in the sense that they have the
instrumentalities forproducingandperfectingagood form ofgovernment.
On the other hand, no government is at all adapted for producing,
perfecting, or propagating a good religion .... Religion is the parent, and
not the offspring, of good government."
Accordingly, noted the court, good religion is best secured by a policy of
"masterly inactivity" that allows "free conflict of opinions as to things
divine."76 The role of the state in religious matters is merely to "keep[ ] the
conflict free, and prevent[ ] the violation of private rights or of the public
peace." 77
A second case is Pfefierv. Board ofEducation. In 1896, the Board of
Education ofthe city of Detroit bought4000 copies ofabooktitled "Readings
from the Bible" and introduced the books into the grammar grades of the
72Id. at 243-44.73Id. at 245.
74Id.
7s Id. at 248-49.
76Id. at 251.
nId.
78 Pfeiffer v. Bd. of Educ., 77 N.W. 250 (Mich. 1898).
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public schools of the city under a resolution requiring the book to be read
daily at "such time as the superintendent shall direct"79 Parents could excuse
their children from the exercise upon written application to the superinten-
dent'8 Conrad Pfeiffer, a Detroit taxpayer and parent of a thirteen year-old
pubic school student," objected to the readings on the ground that they
violated the Michigan Constitution's prohibitions ofcompulsory attendance
atreligious worship, the expenditure of money for religious purposes, and the
enlargement or diminution of civil or political rights on the basis ofreligious
belief. Pfeiffer petitioned the circuit court for a writ of mandamus compel-
ling the school board to discontinue the readings.' The court granted the
petition and the school board appealed."
The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the circuit court and allowed the
readings to continue.' Writing for the majority, Justice Montgomery
observed that the Michigan Constitution was adopted pursuant to the
provisions of the Northwest Ordinance, and then recited the Ordinance's
RMK language." Reasoning that the Michigan Constitution would carry
forward the spirit, ifnotthe provisions ofthe RMK clause, Montgomery held
that "[ilt is not to be inferred that, in forming a constitution under the
authority ofthis ordinance, the [Michigan constitutional] convention intended
to prohibit in the public schools all mention ofa subject which the ordinance,
in effect, declared that schools were to be established to foster."" The
Ordinance's RMK clause, in otherwords, was read into the religious freedom
provisions of the Michigan Constitution as a limitation on those provisions'
meaning.'Atthe same time, Montgomery denied thatthe Ordinance required
schools to teach religion:
79Id. at 253 (Moore, J., dissenting).8oId. (Moore, J., dissenting).
8 Id. (Moore, J., dissenting).82 Id. at 250-51.
83 Id. at 253 (Moore, I., dissenting).841 Id. at 258 (Moore, ., dissenting).
85 Id. at 253.
86 Id. at 251-52. Note that there was no RMK language in the Michigan
Constitution itself. Rather, the court was interpreting the Northwest Ordinance
directly, as the legal background of the Michigan Constitution.87 Id. at 252.
11 Montgomery's argument is, to say the least, suspect. In Permoli v. First
Municipality, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589, 609-10 (1845), and Strader v. Graham, 51
U.S. (10 How.) 82, 94-97 (1850), the Supreme Court held that the Northwest
Ordinance ceased to have legal effect in political entities formed from the
Northwest Territory once those entities became states. Michigan was free to depart
from the provisions of the Ordinance in framing its constitution, and nothing
required Montgomery to read the Ordinance forward into that document.
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I do not wish to be understood as assenting to the proposition that the
ordinance of 1787 makes it imperative that religion shall be taught in the
public schools. It was doubtless the opinion of the framers of that great
document that public schools would of necessity tend to foster religion. But
the extent to which I go is to say that the language of this instrument, when
read inthe light ofthe fact that this was atthat date aChristian nation, is such
as to preclude the idea that the fiamers of the constitution, "in conformity
with the principles contained in the ordinance," intended, in the absence of
a clear expression to that effect, to exclude wholly from the school all
reference to the Bible. 9
In avigorous dissenting opinion, JusticeMoore excoriated the majority's
reasoning, reproducing Judge Carpenter's lower court opinion and large
sections of Board ofEducation v. Mmor in the process?° Moore relied upon
Carpenter's opinion to do most of the work in responding to the school
board's arguments about theNorthwest Ordinance. Carpenterheld that state-
sponsored Bible reading was a straightforward violation of the religious
freedom provisions of the Michigan Constitution,9' and that the state
constitution trumped the Northwest Ordinance in religious matters:
It is impossible that the people meant the precise opposite of what they
explicitly declared. If the ordinance imposes taxation for the support of
teachers ofreligion, the people, when they asserted [in the preamble to the
constitution] they had complied with its provisions by making a constitution
which forbade such support, could not have thought that to be a condition
with which they were bound to comply. They expressed themselves clearly
in their constitution as to the continuance in force of existing laws by saying:
"[a]ll laws now in force in the territory of Michigan which are not repugnant
to this constitution, shall remain in force until they expire by their own
limitation or be altered or repealed by the legislature."'
89 Pfeiffer, 77 N.W. at 252. The material in quotation marks is taken from
Article V of the Northwest Ordinance which provided that, after a state formed
from the Northwest Territory was admitted to the union, it was at liberty to adopt
a constitution, provided that the constitution was "in conformity to the principles
contained in these articles." Act to Provide for the Government of the Territory
North-west of the River Ohio, Ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 53 n.(a) (1789).
9 Pfeiffer, 77 N.W. at 253 (Moore, L, dissenting).
9 Id. at 258 (Moore, J., dissenting). "Our constitutional provisions respecting
religious liberty mean precisely what they declare .... Respondent's proposed use
of 'Readings from the Bible' in public schools is in direct conflict with these
constitutional provisions." Id. (Moore, J., dissenting).92Id. at 254 (Moore, L, dissenting).
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More importantly, Carpenter held that, even if the Ordinance still had
some continuing legal validity in the state, the Ordinance's RMK clause did
not require Michigan schools to teach religion:
This language is clear. It enjoins foreverthe encouragement ofschools and
all means of education, because religion, morality, and knowledge, being
essential to good government and the happiness of mankind, will be
promoted thereby. It is an expression of the faith that I was taught as a
child, and that I, in common with many others, still hold, that, as you
increase the efficiency of schools and other means of education, religion,
morality, and knowledge will prosper.93
Hence, nothing in Pfeiffer suggests that the Northwest Ordinance's RMK
language was understood to require schools to teach religion. The majority
affirmed the practice of Bible reading but did not believe the Ordinance
required such practice, and the dissent found nothing in the Ordinance to
preventthe religious freedom provisions oftheMichigan Constitution from
being read in the broadest possible manner.
A third case is People ex rel. Ring v. Board ofEducation.4 In Ring a
group of Catholic parents objected to the reading of the King James Bible,
the saying of the Protestant version of the Lord's Prayer, and the singing of
hymns in the public schools of Scott County, Illinois.9s The parents argued
that these practices amounted to "devotional, sectarian exercises" that
violated their "right of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship." A lower court dismissed the petition and in 1910
the parents appealed to the Illinois Supreme court.' While the court noted
that the First Amendment to the United States Constitution "left [the state]
free to enact such laws in respect to religion as [it] may deem proper, '98 it
held that the state constitution guaranteed the right of religious freedom,
and that this freedom included the right not to worship." Additionally, the
court noted that, while the territory had been under the jurisdiction of the
Northwest Ordinance for many years,"° no support for prayer and Bible
reading could be found in the Ordinance's RMK language. Not only was
93 Id. at 254-55 (Moore, J., dissenting).
' People cc rel. Ring v. Bd. of Educ. 24, 92 N.E. 251 (Ill. 1910).
95Id. at 251.
9Id.
97Id.
98 Id. at 252. The Establishment Clause was not incorporated until Everson v.
Board ofEducation, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
9 Ring, 92 N.E. at 253.
10D Id.
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the Ordinance no longer in force, having been superceded by the state
constitution, but:
The ordinance did not.., by any means as originally adopted, impose
upon the states the duty of religious instruction in the schools which were
to be encouraged. It recognized education as a means promotive of
religion and morality by the increase of knowledge. The recital or
preamble recognized religion, morality, and knowledge as three things
essential to good government and the happiness of the people, and to
secure those three things it enacted, not that religious instruction (which
is not within the province of civil government) should be given by the
states, but that the means of education should be encouraged, and thus the
essentials of good government should be promoted."
Thus, case law directly refutes Barton's argument that the Ordinance's
RMK language required schools to teach religion."° Two of the three
courts to address the issue held that the clause mandated only the promo-
tion of general knowledge, and the third held only that, in light of the
clause, the religious freedom provisions of the state constitution should not
be read to ban Bible reading in the schools in the absence of a clear
statement from the legislature to the contrary. 3 Therefore, Barton's claim
is entirely without historical supporL °
101 Id.
o' With the exception ofLate Corp. ofthe Church ofJesus Christ ofLatter-Day
Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890), no early federal case attempted to
interpret the meaning of the Ordinance's RMK clause. Late Corp. concerned the
disposal of property once owned by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
(Mormon), since forfeited to the United States. The Court applied the cy pres
doctrine and distributed the property to benefit the common schools of the Utah
Territory. The Court cited the Ordinance's RMK clause as evidence that"[s]chools
and education were regarded by the Congress of the Confederation as the most
natural and obvious appliances for the promotion of religion and morality," id. at
65, but said nothing about the actual effect of the clause on territorial education.
03 A fourth related state case deserves brief mention. In State ex rel. Weiss v.
District Board., 44 N.W. 967 (Wis. 1890), a state supreme court struck down the
practice of Bible reading in the schools of Edgerton, Wisconsin. The majority
ignored the school board's reference to the Ordinance's RMK clause and held that
the case "must be decided under the constitution and laws of this state now in
force." Id. at 973. A concurring opinion held that the school board's claim that the
RMK clause required the state to "foster and encourage" religion "is, to say the
least, debatable." Id. at 977. Neither opinion, however, addresses directly the
question whether the clause required schools to teach religion.
101 It is worth noting that, since the publication of his book, MYTH OF
SEPARATION, Barton appears to have backed away from the claim that the
2000-20011
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
2. The Legislative History of the RMK Clause
Suggests the Framers Did Not Want to Directly Support Religion
While mainstream accommodationists generally do not claim that the
RMK clause required schools in the Northwest Territory to teach religion,
they are nevertheless agreed thatthe clause is incompatible with separation-
ist readings of the First Amendment. The typical mainstream argument is
that the clause evidences an intention on the part of the framers of the
Ordinance to encourage religion and religious education. Harold Berman,
for example, suggests that the Ordinance "provided for government
establishment of religious schools," 5 while Walter Berns asserts that the
Ordinance "promot[ed] religious and moral education."1 6 Gerard Bradley
finds that the Ordinance, "closely inspected, implies that schools would
ensure good government by inculcating religion, morality, and
knowledge,"1"7 while Charles Rice contends that the clause was a "sanc-
tion" for the "benevolent promotion" of religion by the state.0"
Standing somewhat apart from these authors, Justice William
Rehnquist is content merely to hold that the Ordinance "confirm[s] the
view that Congress did not mean that the Government should be neutral
between religion and irreligion."'" Significantly, none of these claims is
accompanied by a substantive analysis of the grammar of the RMK clause,
or a review of the historical evidence about the actual effect of the
Ordinance on territorial government and education.
As should be clear from the previous section, separationists have good
responses to each of these claims. Contra Berman and Berns, it is simply
Ordinance required religious instruction in the schools. In his most recent work he
omits the claim and says merely that "[the Framers of the Ordinance... believed
that schools and educational systems were a proper means to encourage the
'religion, morality, and knowledge' which they deemed so 'necessary to good
government and the happiness of mankind."' DAVID BARTON, ORIGINAL INTENT:
THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND RELIGION 41 (1997).
1o5 Harold J. Berman, Religious Freedom and the Challenge of the Modern
State, in ARTICLES OF FAITH, ARTICLES OF PEACE: THE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
CLAUSES AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 48 (James Davison Hunter &
Os Guinness eds., 1990).
'
06 BERNS, supra note 2, at 8.
,
0 7 BRADLEY, supra note 2, at 125. Bradley's statement occurs in a paragraph
dealing with the role of "common [publicly supported] schools" in the promotion
of religion. This is odd placement for the statement in that the Ordinance did not
create a system of common schools. Seesupra notes 48-61 and accompanying text.
103 RICE, supra note 36, at 31.
o Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 100 (1985) (Rehnquist, I., dissenting).
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untrue that the Northwest Ordinance provided for religious schools or
promoted religious education. The Ordinance had nothing to do with
territorial schools, except to express encouragement for education in the
vaguest of terms. ° Contra Bradley, the Ordinance does not assume that
schools would inculcate religion; it is just as likely that the framers
believed that public education would benefit religion indirectly, by the
promotion of general knowledge.' Contra Rice, the Ordinance did not
sanction anything with respect to religion,"' except religious tolerance."'
Finally, while Rehnquist is correct that the wording of the RMK clause
implies a preference for religion over irreligion, this is not itself evidence
for accommodationism. The framers of the Ordinance may have preferred
religion to irreligion, but they apparently did nothing to enact that
preference into law. It is telling that the framers justified public schooling
on the ground that it would promote religion, yet did not set up a school
system in the Ordinance, or require territorial government to provide for
schools. It is hardly an argument for accommodationism that the framers
expressed a preference for religion yet refused to act upon it.
Beyond these points, accommodationists do not consider either the
history of prior congressional attempts to provide for governance in the
Northwest Territory" or the history of the RMK clause itself. These
histories suggest that Congress was wary of writing direct support for
religion into the governing documents of the Old Northwest. In 1785, for
example, Congress rejected an attempt to insert language aiding religion
into a bill "for ascertaining the mode of locating and disposing of lands in
the Western Territory."'15 The first version of the bill, penned by Thomas
Jefferson and presented to Congress in 1784, authorized the survey of the
Northwest Territory for the purpose of dividing it into sections for sale to
the public." 6 The bill set aside no land for either education or religion.H
7
Action on the bill was postponed until April 1785 when a thoroughly
"
0 See supra notes 48-61 and accompanying text
"See supra notes 64-104 and accompanying text
"
2 See supra notes 64-104 and accompanying text
"
3 See supra note 11.
14 TheNorthwest Ordinance was not the first attempt to provide for governance
in the Old Northwest See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
11 27 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1784, at 446 (1928).
16 HIBBARD, supra note 51, at 37. This bill should not be confused with
Jefferson's Ordinance of 1784, which set up a temporary government for the
Northwest Territory and had nothing to do with land sales. See supra note 5 1. See
also infra notes 128-29.
"7 HIBBARD, supra note 51, at 37-38.
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reworked version of the ordinance was presented to Congress."' This bill,
most likely the work of William Grayson of Virginia and Rufus King of
Massachusetts,"' divided the Territory into townships of forty-nine miles
square12° and contained the following provision:
There shall be reserved the central Section of every Township, for the
maintenance of public Schools; andthe Section immediately adjoining the
same to the northward for the support of religion. The profits arising
therefrom in both instances, to be applied for ever according to the will of
the majority of male residents of full age within the same.I
The provision would clearly have committed the federal government to a
policy of supporting religion in the Northwest Territory.
After considerable debate, Congress elected to retain the land
reservations for education while abandoning the reservations for religion."
The resulting Land Ordinance of 1785 "helped," in the words of one
historian, to "determine that the new western lands would be free from
federal governmental support of religion."'" The rejection of the land
reservations particularly pleased James Madison, who was then leading a
difficult fight in the Virginia legislature to enact Jefferson's Bill for
Religious Freedom.' In a famous letter to his friend James Monroe (who,
as a Virginia delegate to the Continental Congress, had voted in favor of
the land reservations for religion)," Madison left no doubt that he "was
aghast that such a provision so contrary to the spirit of religious liberty
should have ever been proposed at all." '126 Wrote Madison:
It gives me much pleasure to observe.., that... Congs. had expunged a
clause ... setting apart a district of land in each Township, for supporting
"Id. at 38.
119 Ronald A. Smith, Freedom ofReligion and The Land Ordinance of1 785, in
24 JOURNAL OF CHURCH AND STATE 589, 594 (1982).
120 28 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 299 (1933).
21 Id. at 293 (emphasis added).
12 Smith, supra note 119, at 595-96. The vote was extremely close. While only
five states voted to retain the reservations (two short of the nunber required), at the
level of individual delegates the vote was seventeen to six infavor of retention. Id.
at 596. The votes of three states favoring retention were ignored because each was
represented by a single delegate, instead of the two required by the Articles of
Confederation. Id. at 595-96 n.35.
123 Id. at 601.124 Id. at 598.
125 Id. at 599.
12 DAVIS, CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 30, at 170.
THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE
the Religion of the Majority of inhabitants. How a regulation, so unjust in
itself, so foreign to the Authority of Congs. so hurtful to the sale of the
public land, and smelling so strongly ofan antiquated Bigotry, could have
received the countenance of a Committee is truly [a] matter of astonish-
ment.
127
Two years later Congress took a similar stand against direct aid to
religion by modifying the language of the RMK clause itself. In 1784
Congress passed the first ordinance establishing a temporary government
in the Northwest Territory. ' The ordinance proved deficient in a number
of respects," and by 1786 Congress was working on replacement
legislation that would ultimately become the Northwest Ordinance."30 By
1787 Congress was anxious to complete the work, spurred on by an offer
from the Ohio Company-a group of Revolutionary War veterans who had
organized to try their hand at land speculationM--to buy large tracts of
land in the Territory.132 Concerned to secure good terms for the purchase,
the Company dispatched one of its directors, the Reverend Manasseh
Cutler, to New York to negotiate directly with Congress.' In addition to
negotiating for land, Cutler also made a number of suggestions to Congress
for the improvement of the ordinance, which was not yet in final form."3 4
Perhaps as a result of Cutler's work, the draft of the ordinance considered
by Congress on July 11, 1787 contained the first version of what would
become the RMK clause.' This version read: "Institutions for the
promotion of religion and morality, schools and the means of education
shall forever be encouraged, and all persons while young shall be taught
some useful Occupation."' 36
127 8 THEPAPERS OFJAMESMADISON 286 (RobertA. Rutland et al. eds., 1973).
'2 FARRAND, supra note 51, at 7.
'
21 Id. at 7-8; Duffey, supra note 10, at 936.
130 FARRAND, supra note 51, at 8.
"I TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 21-22.
132 d. at 23-24.
'
31 Id. at 24.
13 Id. at 24-25.
135 Id. at 46-47. As New Englanders, the members of the Ohio Company would
have naturally favored state support of both religion and education. Id. at 47.
Similarly, as arepresentative of the Company, Cutler would certainly have "exerted
his influence.., to have these [positions] incorporated into the Ordinance of
1787." Id.
136 32 JOURNALS OFTHE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 318 (1936).
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In listing "institutions for the promotion of religion and morality"
among the objects to be "forever... encouraged'" in the Territory, the
provision was accommodationist in both form and spirit.' Given the long
tradition of government support for religion in many of the states, 139 and the
heavy involvement of the Continental Congress in matters religious,14' the
framers of the ordinance may well have assumed that the provision would
garner little opposition or debate. Nevertheless, Congress appears to have
balked at the prospect of providing direct support for religion. When the
Northwest Ordinance became law on July 13, 1787141 the provision had
been stripped of its language encouraging support for religious institutions
and changed to its present form, which only encouraged "[s]chools and the
means of education." 42 The final version of the RMK clause, passed
unanimously by the last Congress to sit under the Articles of Confedera-
tion,43 acknowledged religion and morality as "necessary to good
government and the happiness of mankind," but did nothing to provide
either with government support.
If accommodationists are right that the RMK clause was intended to
establish religious schools, promote religious education, or provide for the
benevolent promotion of religion, this change in wording is inexplicable.
It is impossible that a Congress intent on supporting religion in the
Territory would abandon language that allowed such support in favor of
language that did not. The Congress of the Confederation certainly had
little hesitation in supporting religion in other circumstances.'" The more
reasonable interpretation is that Congress did not want to aid religion
directly, and so they altered the language of the RMK clause to make that
point clear, while at the same time retaining language that affirmed the
137 Id.
13 8 See DAvIs, CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 30, at 170 ("This [version
of the clause] was an obvious attempt to provide that churches ('institutions for the
promotion of religion and morality') and schools would be encouraged"). Id.
139 See, e.g., BRADLEY, supra note 2, at 19-57.
140 DAvis, CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 30, reviews the history of
Congress under the Articles of Confederation and concludes that, despite the
"impressive" record of Congress on religious issues, id. at 203, the Continental
Congress "operated almost totally within an accommodationist paradigm." Id. at
202.
41 FARRAND, supra note 51, at 8.
142 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 136, at 340.
143 Id. at 343.
'44 See DAvIS, CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 30, at 200-02.
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importance of religion and morality to civic life. If this interpretation is
atcurate the change of wording suggests the beginnings of an even more
fundamental change in the orientation of Congress toward support for
religion, e.g., an "attempt[ ] to ensure that the sustenance of religious life
would come from the people and the schools, not from the government"
1 45
In summary, the text of the Northwest Ordinance offers no support for
accommodationism. The RMK clause did not mandate the teaching of
religion in schools. It also did not substantively advance schooling in the
Northwest Territory nor did it provide for federal regulation of the
territorial schools. It was not understood by state courts to require the direct
advancement of religion nor was it obviously intended to "promote" or
"encourage" religious education. Ultimately, it was stripped of its language
encouraging direct aid to religion. While the Ordinance did contain
guarantees of religious freedom, it was otherwise silent on matters of faith.
It goes well beyond the evidence to assert that the RMK clause, or the
Ordinance in general, encouraged federal support for religion.
B. Land Sales Under the Northwest Ordinance
A separate argument that the Northwest Ordinance supports an
accommodationist reading of the First Amendment is that, in the years
following the passage of the Ordinance, Congress sold two large tracts of
territorial land with the stipulation that section twenty-nine of each
township contained therein be reserved for the support of religion.46 The
terms of these sales, 1.5 million acres to the Ohio Company 147 and another
million acres to John Cleave Symmes,'4 also stipulated that section sixteen
of each township be reserved for the support of schools, and that additional
land be set aside for the purposes of a university. 49 The terms of a third
major contract, an option for the Scioto Company to purchase some five
million acres of land,'50 although contemporaneous with the Ohio Company
purchase, contained no reservations for religion. 5'
145 DAVIS, supra note 1, at 108-09.
14' HIBBARD, supra note 51, at 49. The effect of the stipulation was to resurrect
the substance of the provision rejected by Congress in passing the Ordinance of
1785. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
147 HIBBARD, supra note 51, at 49.
148 Id. at 50-51.
149 Id. at49.
150 TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 60-61.
'.. HIBBARD, supra note 51, at 49.
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Gerard Bradley 52 and John Baker 53 devote considerable effort to
developing the accommodationist implications of these sales. Neither,
however, scores a direct hit on the Ordinance. Bradley's argument is
twofold: not only are the land reservations contained in the Ohio Company
and Symmes transactions facially inconsistent with the wall of separation,
they were only a small part of a broader web of laws that "suffused" the
Northwest Territory with "aid, encouragement, and support for religion.' 54
In addition to the land reservations, there were independent grants of land
for supporting religion in Illinois,"5  and other grants-many of which were
authorized after the adoption of the Constitution--to missionary societies
working in the Territory to evangelize frontier Indians' 56 What is more, the
first federal Congress knew about these laws when it reenacted the
Northwest Ordinance in 1789.' According to Bradley, this knowledge is
important because it proves that the First Congress did not believe "in the
complete separation of church and state."'58 On the contrary, the reenact-
ment "effectively continued arrangements ordained by the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787," of which "aid, encouragement, and support of
religion" were a part.159 But while Congressional aid to religion was a
common occurrence in the Northwest Territory, Bradley's conclusion
follows only if the land grants and reservations Congress knew about, and
which breached the idea of separation, had something to do with the
Ordinance. If the land grants were independent of the Ordinance, and if
Congress knew they were independent, the reenactment of the Ordinance
would say nothing about Congress's attitude toward the land grants, or
about the relationship between church and state generally.
In fact, neither the Ohio Company or Symmes reservations, nor any of
the other land grants identified by Bradley, had anything to do with the
Ordinance. This can be seen, not only in the Ordinance, which contains no
152 BRADLEY, supra note 2, at 98-101.
113 Baker, supra note 26, at 48-50.
154 BRADLEY, supra note 2, at 98.
115 Id. at 99.
156 Id. at 99-100. Separationists argue that these land grants prove too much.
The grants were given to individual religious societies, making it impossible to see
them as non-preferential. Id. The land grants, in other words, are equally non-
supportive of both the separationist and accommodationist accounts of history.
157 Id. at 98.
158 Id.
159 Id.
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provisions whatsoever regarding land disposal in the Territory, 16° but also
from the text of Congress's report of July 23, 1787, which set out the terms
of the proposed land sale to the Ohio Company.61 The report does not
reference the Northwest Ordinance, which became law ten days earlier, but
the Land Ordinance of 1785.162 It was the Ordinance of 1785 that governed
land sales in the Territory, 63 and it remained good law until 1796.'"
Moreover, the terms contained in the report deviated from the Ordinance
of 1785. While the report specified that lot sixteen in each township was to
be "given perpetually for the purposes contained in the said Ordinance [i.e.,
schools], '1 5 it also specified that lot twenty-nine in each township was to
be "given perpetually for the purposes of religion."'" Recall that the
framers of the Ordinance of 1785 failed to include language that would
have reserved land for religion.67 Hence, in requiring the Ohio Company
to set aside section twenty-nine of each township for religious purposes,
Congress was acting independently of either of the governing documents
then in force in the Territory.68 Indeed, the report of July 23 appears to
recognize this independence when it points out that the land reservations
for education were for "the purposes contained in the said Ordinance,"'69
while omitting those words from the grants for religion. 7 0 Similarly, the
160 TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 54.
161 33 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 399-401
(1936).
' Id. at 400.
' TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 47. The Northwest Ordinance repealed only
Jefferson's Ordinance of 1784--Congress's first attempt to provide forgovemance
in the Northwest Territory. See BRADLEY, supra note 2, at 98. See also supra notes
128-29 and accompanying text.
164 HIBBARD, supra note 51, at 66-67.
16s 33 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 161, at 400.
166 Id.
'
67 See supra notes 114-27 and accompanying text
The relationship of the Ohio Company purchase to the Ordinance of 1785
is a matter of some controversy. Taylor, for example, agrees that "the provisions
of the [Ohio Company] ordinance were not in complete harmony with the system
of surveys and sales which was established by the Ordinance of 1785." TAYLOR,
supra note 9, at 59. Nevertheless, Taylor does not believe the sale required the
"suspension" of the Land Ordinance. Id. Taylor's position is that the Ohio
Company Ordinance was "supplementary to the Ordinance of 1785 rather than in
opposition to it." Id. at 60.
169 33 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 161, at 400.
10See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
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land reservation in the Symmes purchase and the other land grants
identified by Bradley were independent of the Ordinance. 7' It is simply not
true, as Bradley implies, that the Ohio Company and Symmes land
reservations were part of the arrangements "ordained by the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787.""7 Reenacting the Ordinance would have had no effect
on the continuing validity of the land reservations, and thus implies nothing
about Congress's attitude toward church and state.
Baker's argument concerns James Madison's role in shaping the terms
of the Ohio Company purchase and the implication of those terms for our
understanding of Madison's attitude toward separation." As noted earlier,
Madison opposed the attempt to include land reservations for religion in the
Ordinance of 1785." Nevertheless, Madison's name appears as one of the
members ofthe committee that drafted the July 23, 1787 report establishing
the terms of the Ohio Company sale, which included land reservations for
religion. 5 Baker reconciles the apparent inconsistency by analyzing the
language of the land reservation provisions themselves:
The 1785 provision would have set apart a district of land in each
township "for the support of religion.., of the majority of the male
residents." [The Ohio Company] provisions simply set apart land "for
purposes of religion." The proceeds from the sale of the land were to be
distributed equally among the various sects. 76
Baker, in other words, argues that Madison was acting like a good
accommodationist-he opposed land reservations when they preferred the
17 The Symmes purchase was granted on similar terms as the Ohio Company
purchase, TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 62-63, and is referred to by Taylor as "private
sales [made] by contract." Id. at 54. The Illinois land grants and the land grants to
the various missionary societies were all authorized by separate acts of Congress.
BRADLEY, supra note 2, at 99-100.
17 BRADLEY, supra note 2, at 98.
173 This is a much corrected version of Baker's argument Baker's actual claim
is that Madison was involved "in the drafting of the Northwest Ordinance." Baker,
supra note 26, at 48. This claim is false. Madison did not serve on any of the
committees in charge of drafting versions of the Ordinance. BARRETr, supra note
9, at 36-37, 42, 50-51. Indeed, during the summer of 1787, when Congress was
drawing up the final version of the Ordinance, Madison was in Philadelphia serving
in the Constitutional Convention. See infra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
"4See supra notes 124-27.
175 33 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 161, at 401.
176 Baker, supra note 26, at 49-50.
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religion of the majority, but affirmed them when the land was to be used
equally by all religions. In another sentence Baker directly links the "for the
purposes of religion" language to the First Congress, thereby implying that
Congress, too, understood the difference between preferential and non-
preferential support for religion. He writes:
It would seem difficult to argue that the First Congress, which proposed
the religion clauses of the First Amendment and which by reenacting the
Northwest Ordinance extended religious freedom to the territories, acted
unconstitutionally by promoting religion, morality, and knowledge in
public education and setting aside land "for the purposes of religion."'"n
Nothing credits Baker's account To begin with, the First Congress did
not set aside land "for the purposes of religion." Like Bradley, Baker
appears to assume that, in reenacting the Northwest Ordinance, the First
Congress was also reenacting the terms of the Ohio Company and Symmes
land sales. As suggested above,7" the terms of those sales were independent
of the Ordinance. Even if Congress had never reenacted the Ordinance, the
sales would have continued in force. Second, the premise of Baker's
argument-that the words "for the purposes of religion" would have been
understood by the Ohio Company as a requirement to distribute proceeds
from the land "equally among the various sects" 79-requires a semantic
leap of gigantic proportions. Nothing in the language of the July 23 report
suggests that proceeds from the reserved lands were to be divided among
all religions.80 The words "for the purposes of religion" certainly do not
suggest it Moreover, such a non-preferentialist arrangement was unknown
on American soil.'' It is difficult to believe that Congress would impose
such a novel requirement on land purchasers without explaining the
arrangement in more detail than "lot N 29 ... [is] to be given perpetually
for the purposes of religion.""
Third, it is unlikely that Madison played any role in drafting the July
23 report. The committee responsible for the report was appointed on May
77Id. at49.
' See supra notes 160-68 and accompanying text
171 Baker, supra note 26, at 50.
180 See 33 JOURNALS OFTHE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 161, at 399-
401.
81 Good surveys of the forms of religious establishment in America before
1787 can be found in CURRY, supra note 1, at chs. 1-7; LEVY, supra note 1, at 1-
78. Nothing like the arrangement hypothesized by Baker is found in these surveys.
182 33 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 161, at 400.
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9, 1787,183 seven days after Madison left New York for the Constitutional
Convention.' Madison did not return to New York until September 24,
almost a month after the Ohio Company land sale was completed."s During
the entire drafting process Madison was 100 miles away in Philadelphia
attending to the Constitution. While Madison occasionally corresponded
with members of Congress while in Philadelphia, his surviving papers from
this time contain no references to the drafting committee orto the religious
reservation provisions of the proposed sale. '86 While it may seem odd that
Madison was appointed to a committee during his absence from New York,
the appointment can be explained on the theory that Congress assumed the
Convention would complete its business in short order, and that Madison
would return to New York in time to help the committee draft its report."8 7
Finally, even if it could be shown that Madison participated in the work
of the committee, the terms of the July 23 report do not require the
conclusion that Madison was an accommodationist. Alternative explana-
tions of Madison and the report abound. One possibility, completely
overlooked by Baker, is that Madison disagreed with the reservations but
was simply outvoted by the rest of the committee. A second possibility is
that Madison disagreed with the reservations but voted for them anyway
because he thought they were necessary to secure the sale. A third
183 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 136, at 276 n.2.
The committee was appointed in response to the first proposal by the Ohio
Company to purchase large amounts of land in the Northwest Territory. The
proposal took the form of a memorial presented to Congress on July 8, 1787 by
Gen. Samuel Holden Parsons, the first agent of the Ohio Company to approach
Congress about land acquisition in the Territory. Id. at 276; TAYLOR, supra note
9, at 24.
184 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON xxv (Robert A. Rutland ed., 1975).
185 10 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON xxv (Robert A. Rutland ed., 1977).
'16 Id. The first mention of the Ohio Company land reservations in Madison's
papers occurs in a November 3, 1787 letter from the Virginia congressional
delegation (of which Madison was apart) to Virginia GovernorEdmund Randolph,
more than a month after the Ohio Company land sale was completed. Id. at 239.
The letter, signed by Madison, William Grayson, Edward Carrington, and Henry
Lee, purports to recap the major events of the recently completed legislative
session. It notes that the Ohio Company land sale required the Company to mark
the land "into Townships and Sections, agreeably to the Ordinance [of 1785],
subject to the reserves therein described, except that one of the Sections for future
Sale shall be granted forever for the purposes of Religion." Id.
"I The Convention was called only to reform the Articles of Confederation, a
considerably more limited goal than to write an entirely new Constitution. MAX
FARRAND, THEFRAMING OFTHE CONSTITUTION OF THEUNITED STATES 42 (1926).
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possibility is thatthe committee proposed something even more objection-
able to Madison than land reservations, and the resulting report was the
best that Madison could do. Each of these explanations is as likely as
Baker's argument (the first considerably more so), and none involve the
assumption that the words "for the purposes of religion" were proposed as
a direction to distribute the proceeds of the reserved land equally to all
religions.
Nothing in this section should be taken to suggest that the land
reservations for religion do not constitute a real challenge to separationism.
In particular, the Ohio Company and Symmes land reservations continued
in force after the adoption of the Constitution and the First Amendment. If
separationists are right in arguing thatthe reservations violate the Establish-
ment Clause, they carry the burden of explaining why Congress did not
modify or abolish the reservations after 1789. Rather, the intention of this
section is to demonstrate that, in reenacting the Northwest Ordinance, the
First Congress did not thereby reenact the reservations, or pass judgment
on their constitutionality. When accommodationists cite the Ohio Company
and Symmes land reservations, they do not make an argument relevant to
the reenactment of the Northwest Ordinance. As with the first substantive
argument, it goes well beyond the evidence to argue that-the substantive
provisions of the Ordinance support an accommodationist reading of
history.
I. THE COROLLARY ARGUMENT
As noted earlier,"s accommodationists are aware that neither the RMK
clause or the Ohio Company and Symmes land reservations establish direct
violations of the separationist interpretation of the Establishment Clause.
Both the Ordinance and the land reservations were enacted under the
authority of the Articles of Confederation and can tell us nothing about
what was legal under the First Amendment. Hence, to make their argument,
accommodationists point out that the Ordinance was "reenacted" by the
first Congress to meet under the Constitution189 at about the same time this
'
8
" See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
189 The term "reenact" is not a good description of Congress's actions.
Congress's concern was to "adapt" the Ordinance to the provisions of the new
Constitution, mainly by adjusting the chain of command for territorial decision-
making described in the Ordinance. Act to Provide for the Government of the
Territory North-west of the River Ohio, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 50-51 (1789). The power
to appoint territorial officers, for example, was removed from Congress and given
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Congress was framing the Bill of Rights.'90 Reasoning that Congress would
not simultaneously enact legislation aiding religion while adopting an
amendment that prohibited such aid, accommodationists conclude that
Congress could not have intended the First Amendment to prohibit aid to
religion. This argument treats the Ordinance almost as a commentary on the
First Amendment, as if one could understand the meaning of the Amend-
ment by looking at the Ordinance.
Canonical statements of the corollary argument can be found in the
writings of many scholars. Walter Berns, for example, notes that, in
"readopting" the Northwest Ordinance, the First Congress also readopted
the RMK clause. He concludes that "it is not easy to see how Congress, or
a territorial government acting under the authority of Congress, could
promote religious and moral education under a Constitution that promoted
'the absolute separation ofchurch and state.' ,9, Charles Rice observes that
the Ordinance was adopted verbatim by the First Congress despite its
"sanction of a benevolent promotion by the state of religious education." 92
Similarly, Rodney Smith argues thatthe reenactment "offers further support
for the proposition that the First Congress felt that the accommodation and
even facilitation of religious exercise in the public sector was permitted by
the First Amendment.""'9 The statements of John Baker 94 and Gerard
to the President of the United States, subject to the advice and consent of the
Senate. Id. at 52-53. The preamble of the Act seems to assume that the Ordinance
would have remained in effect in the absence of action on the part of the First
Congress. Id. at 50-51; David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Substantive
Issues in the First Congress, 1789-1791, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 775, 845 (1994).
Nevertheless, the word "reenact" is common in the literature and is used in this
Note.
11 The Ordinance was reenacted on August 7, 1789. 6 DOCUMENTARY HIS-
TORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791: LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES,
MIGRATIONS OF FINES BILL THROUGH RESOLUTION OF UNCLAIMED WESTERN
LANDS 1561 (Charlene Bangs Bickford & Helen E. Veit eds., 1986). The First
Amendment was approved by Congress on September25, 1789.4DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OFTHEFIRsTFEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791: LEGISLATIVEHISTORIES,
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION THROUGH FOREIGN OFFICERS BILL 48
(Charlene Bangs Bickford & Helen E. Veit eds., 1986).
191 BERNS, supra note 2, at 7-8.
11 RICE, supra note 36. Rice, of course, is wrong in claiming that Congress
readopted the Ordinance verbatim. At least some of the substantive provisions of
the Ordinance were changed in the reenactment. See supra note 177.
193 SMITH, supra note 2, at 105.
,"See supra note 177.
[VOL. 89
THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE
Bradley195 to this effect have already been noted. It is Justice William
Rehnquist, however, who puts the argument most forcefully:
The House of Representatives took up the Northwest Ordinance on the
sameday as Madison introducedhisproposed amendments which became
the Bill of Rights;19 ... [iUt seems highly unlikely that the House of
Representatives would simultaneously consider proposed amendments to
the Constitution and enact an important piece of territorial legislation
which conflicted with the intent of those proposals.'9
Obviously, Rehnquist's argument assumes that the Northwest
Ordinance either required or encouraged federal aid to religion. As
suggested in Part I of this Note, this is a matter of great doubt. Even if
Rehnquist is right about aid to religion, however, he is wrong in thinking
that the reenactment of the Ordinance had implications for the First
Amendment. The key to the problem is Rehnquist's assumption that the
reenactment of the Ordinance and the framing of the Bill of Rights was, at
some level, "simultaneous." Rehnquist's argument, like all those noted
above, is that the degree of overlap between Congress's work on the
Ordinance and Congress's work on the First Amendment was such that
discrepancies between the two would have been immediately evident to
members of Congress. Rehnquist uses the word "simultaneous," but the
point is equally well made by Rice, who notes that the Ordinance was
reenacted "during the period when Congress was considering the proposed
amendments to the Constitution,"'" and by Bradley, who argues incor-
rectly, that on July 21, 1789, the House of Representatives both "debated
the Establishment Clause" and passed theNorthwest Ordinance. 19 For each
'
95 See supra notes 154-59.
11 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 100 (1985). This statement is false. The
House first took up the Northwest Ordinance on July 14, 1789 when a committee
was appointed to create a bill to "provide for the government of the Western
Territory." 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-
1791: HousE OF REPRESENTATIVES JOURNAL 110 (Linda Grant De Pauw ed.,
1977). Madison introduced his proposed amendments to the Constitution on June
8, 1789, long before work began on the Ordinance. Id. at 84.
19 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 100.
"' RICE, supra note 36.
19 BRADLEY, supra note 2, at 98. The House of Representatives did not debate
the Establishment Clause on July 21,1789. The debate on that day was whether the
House should discuss Madison's amendments on the floor or refer them to a special
committee. 11 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OFTHEFIRSTFEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-
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of these scholars, the ultimate guarantee that the Ordinance and the
amendments were internally consistent is that Congress considered them
both at the same time. More precisely, each assumes that the chronological
proximity of the Ordinance and the amendments means that Congress could
not have voted for one proposal without understanding its implications for
the other.
To Rehnquist's credit, there is a sense in which Congress's consider-
ation of the Ordinance and the proposed First Amendment were simulta-
neous. The Bill of Rights, including the religion clauses, was introduced
into the House of Representatives on June 8, 1789 and was approved by
Congress on September 25.2" Work on the reenactment began July 14,
1789 and was finished on August 5.2"1 Work on the Bill of Rights, in other
words, wholly encompassed work on the Ordinance. But these dates
obscure the more important sense in which the Ordinance and the First
Amendment were strangers. Although Madison introduced the religion
clauses on June 8, they were not debated in Congress until August 15,2' ten
days after Congress voted to reenact the Ordinance, and eight days after the
reenactment became law.203 In other words, the reenactment was approved
before the clauses were ever subjected to scrutiny in either house. This is
not the sort of overlapping presupposed by the corollary argument. Rather
than being simultaneous, Congress's work on the Ordinance was distinct
from its work on the First Amendment. As separationist scholar Derek
Davis writes, "[t]he argument that Congress, in passing the Northwest
Ordinance, did so in contravention of matters that it had not yet even
discussed on the floor, is hardly convincing."' 4
A possible response to this argument is to assume that Congress was so
familiar with the content and implications of Madison's original proposals
that such content would have been in the minds of the reenactors even in
the absence of discussion or debate. The difficulty with this view is that the
1791: DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATiVES 1157-58 (Charlene Bangs
Bickford et al. eds., 1992). No specific amendment was ever discussed. See id. at
1158-63.
2m 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note
190, at 3, 9.
201 6 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note
190, at 1560-1561.
202 11 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note
199, at 1260-63.
203 6 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note
190, at 1561.
2 04 DAVIS, CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 30, at 171.
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wording, and presumably the meaning, of the religion clauses changed
dramatically afterthey were first introduced into the House. It is impossible
that Congress could have anticipated either the final form of the religion
clauses or the course of the debate that attended their passage through
Congress. The nature and extent of Congress's alterations of Madison's
proposals can be gleaned from the following brief description of the
legislative history of the religion clauses as they made their way through
the House and Senate.
Madison introduced the religion clauses into the House ofRepresenta-
tives on June 8, 1789.205 This version read: "[T]he civil rights of none shall
be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national
religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be
in any manner, or on any pretext infringed."2 °' When it emerged from a
select House committee on July 28, however, the proposal had been pared
down to read: "'No religion shall be established by law, nor shall the equal
rights of conscience be infringed.' 207 The committee not only removed the
word "national" from the "no establishment" guarantee, thereby reducing
its value as support for accommodationism, °8 it also eliminated Madison's
language about civil rights. On August 15, the House, sitting as a Commit-
tee of the Whole, debated the proposal and changed it to read: "Congress
shall make no laws touching religion, or infringing the rights of con-
science."2 9 This version eliminated the "no establishment" guarantee
altogether and substituted in its place the much broader prohibition of laws
even "touching" religion. The House made its final changes to the proposal
on August 20, eliminating the recently added "no touching" language and
producing the version that, after some stylistic modification, was submitted
to the Senate--"Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof, nor shall the rights of conscience be
infringed.""21
205 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note
190, at 9.
20 Id. at 10.207Id. at28.
2m CORD, supra note 2, at 7.
209 11 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note
199, at 1262. The House also considered and rejected two other amendments to the
proposed version, including Elbridge Gerry's amendment that the clause should
read"no religious doctrine shall be established by law," id. at 1261, and Madison's
proposal to put the word "national" back into the amendment. Id. at 1262.210 LEVY, supra note 1, at 102.
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On September 3, 1789, the Senate considered three amendments to the
House proposal, all ofwhich seemed narrowly tailored to prohibit Congress
from establishing a single religion in preference to others.21 The Senate
rejected these versions in favor of the following, much broader language:
"Congress shall make no law establishing religion.""2 2 Six days later the
Senate approved its final version, which declared, "Congress shall make no
law establishing articles of faith or a mode of worship, or prohibiting the
free exercise of religion ..... 213 This version seems, at least partly, to
reinstate the accommodationist philosophy of the amendments rejected by
the Senate on September 3. The Senate version then went to a conference
committee which reconciled the House and Senate proposals. 2' 4 On
September 25, this committee produced the version enacted by the
states--"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
Religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."215
Even if we assume that the members of Congress were conversant with
Madison's original proposal for the religion clauses, it was not Madison's
proposal that emerged from Congress. Unlike Madison's proposal, the final
version prohibited notjust the establishment of a national religion, but even
laws "respecting" establishment. Note that the word "respecting" did not
211 The amendments were as follows: (1)"[T]o strike out thesewords, 'Religion
orprohibitingthe free exercise thereof,' and insert, '[o]neReligious Sect or Society
in preference to others,"' (2) "To adopt the following, in lieu of the third Article,
'Congress shall not make any law, infringing the rights of conscience, or
establishing any Religious Sect or Society," and (3) "Congress shall make no law
establishing any particular denomination of religion in preference to another, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof, nor shall the rights of conscience be
infringed." 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-
1791: SENATE LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL 151 (Linda Grant De Pauw ed., 1972). The
mention of "the third Article" in (2), above, refers to what is now the First
Amendment. The First Amendment was originally the third of twelve amendments
submitted to the states for approval. 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST
FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 190, at 46-47.
212 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note
211, at 151. The amendment to the House language formally read: "To adopt the
third Article proposed in the Resolve of the House of Representatives, amended by
striking out these words---'[n]or shall the rights of conscience be infringed' ...."
Id.
213 Id.
214 LEVY, supra note 1, at 103.
215 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note
190, at 47 (emphasis added).
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appear in any prior version of the Amendment considered by Congress.216
It is impossible that the reenactors of the Northwest Ordinance could have
anticipated that the final version of the First Amendment would contain the
word "respecting." Nor could they have anticipated that the final version
would reject Madison's civil rights provisions and the language safeguard-
ing rights of conscience. To the extent that any of these changes affect the
meaning of the First Amendment,2 11 they count as evidence that the
Ordinance was not reenacted with the final version of the Establishment
Clause in mind.
The most important events in the Congressional debates over the
religion clauses are the House debate of August 15, 1789 and the actions
of the Senate in rejecting three alternatives to the proposed House language
for the clauses on September 3. In the House debate, Madison appeared to
say that the religion clauses were intended only to prohibit the establish-
ment of a national religion" 8 Accommodationists find in these remarks
powerful evidence for a narrow reading of the Establishment Clause.2"9
Conversely, separationists see the actions of the Senate in rejecting three
versions of the religion clauses that would have codified the "no prefer-
ence" view of establishment as a powerful rejection of accommodation-
"'
6 See supra notes 206-15 and accompanying text. The closest one can find to
the "respecting" language of the final version of the religion clauses is the
"touching on" language of the amendment of August 15, 1787, which survived for
all of five days in the House of Representatives. See supra notes 209-10 and
accompanying text.
217 The word "respecting," for example, is important to separationists and
accommodationists alike. Separationists see the word as proving that a law can "fall
short of creating an establishment yet still be unconstitutional." LEVY, supra note
1, at 118. Conversely, accommodationists interpret the word as evidence that the
Establishment Clause was merely a federalist guarantee that protected the states
from federal intervention in matters of religion. See MALBIN, supra note 2, at 15.
218 11 DOCuMENTARY HISTORY OFTHEFIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note
199, at 1261-62. Two excerpts from the debate are particularly important to
accommodationists. In the first, Madison argues that the religion clauses were
intended to reassure the states that Congress would have no power to "establish a
religion."Id at 1261. In the second, Madison argues thatthe clauses are a response
to the fear that "one sect might obtain apre-eminence, or two combine together and
establish a religion to which they would compel others to conform," and that
inserting the work "national" before the word "religion" in the version of the
amendment adopted by the House on July 28 "would point the amendment directly
to the object it was intended to prevent." Id at 1262. See supra note 207 and
accompanying text.
219 CORD, supra note 2, at 9-10; see also MALBIN, supra note 2, at 8-9.
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ism.' ° Both of these events happened after the Northwest Ordinance was
enacted. It is entirely possible that members of the First Congress would
have found in these events important guidance as to the meaning of the
final version of the First Amendment. Again, to the extent these events
would have shaped the minds of the First Congress about the meaning of
the religion clauses, they count as evidence that the final versions of the
religion clauses were irrelevant to the reenactment of the Ordinance.
An additional criticism of the corollary argument is that, even if
Congress was aware of a conflict between theNorthwest Ordinance and the
yet-to-be debated religion clauses, there is no reason to think that Congress
would have resolved the difficulty by modifying the Ordinance. There was
no compelling reason to alter the Ordinance to fit the First Amendment
since there was no guarantee the Amendment would ever become law. The
Constitution required three-fourths of the states to approve new amend-
ments, 2  and no one could predict with certainty whether such approval
would materialize. Indeed, the first two amendments proposed by Congress
in 1789 were rejected by the states.' The Bill of Rights itself did not
become effective for more than a year after its passage by Congress.t
Rather than assume that Congress would have prospectively altered the
Ordinance to conform to an amendment not yet part of the Constitution,
and which Congress was powerless to enact on its own,' it is just as likely
that Congress would have approved, the Ordinance as it stood with the
22 0 See supranotes 211-12 and accompanying text; LEvY, supra note 1, at 102;
Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid, supra note 1, at 879-8 1.
221 U.S. CONsT. art V.
m2 Congress originally submitted twelve amendments to the states. 4
DOCUMENTARYHISTORYOFTHEFIRSTFEDERALCONGRESS,supra note 190, at45-
48. Only the last ten amendments were approved. The first amendment established
a formula for determining the number of representatives each state could elect to
the House of Representatives based on increments of population. Id. at 46. The
second amendment prohibited alterations in the compensation for Senators and
Representatives from taking effect in the absence of an intervening congressional
election. Id. The second amendment was ultimately approved by the requisite
number of states in 1992. 1 U.S.C. lxviii.
2The Bill of Rights was submitted to the states upon passage from Congress
in September 1789. It was ratified by the states in November 1790. KELLYETAL.,
supra note 23, at 119.
2 Rehnquist recognizes explicitly that Congress was not bound to follow
amendments not yet passed by the House. Wallace v. Jaifree, 472 U.S. 38, 100
(1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, he does not attempt a response to
that argument.
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understanding that any discrepancies between the Ordinance and the First
Amendment could be remedied if the Amendment happened to become law.
In summary, the corollary argument is not convincing support for an
accommodationist interpretation of the First Amendment. Contrary to the
assumptions of the argument, there is no good reason to think that the work
of the First Congress in reenacting the Northwest Ordinance so overlapped
with the framing of the religion clauses that Congress would have had the
clauses in mind when reenacting the Ordinance. On the contrary, atthe time
of the reenactment the religion clauses had yet to be debated on the floor
of the House or the Senate, and they bore little resemblance to the version
that was finally submitted to the states. It would have been impossible for
the members of the First Congress to anticipate, at the time of the
reenactment, the circuitous rout Madison's amendments would take
through Congress or the final shape of the First Amendment. Even if
accommodationists are right that the substantive provisions of the
Northwest Ordinance violated separationist expectations about the
Establishment Clause, there is no good reason to think that the First
Congress would have been aware of those violations when they reenacted
the Ordinance.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Note has been to take a single argument in the
debate over the meaning of the Establishment Clause and subject it to
searching scrutiny. While references to the Northwest Ordinance are
scattered throughout accommodationist literature, few scholars have dealt
with the issue in adequate depth. This Note suggests that the
accommodationist position rests on two arguments: (1) that the Northwest
Ordinance contains substantive provisions that violate the separationist
reading of the Establishment Clause, and (2) that since the Northwest
Ordinance was reenacted by the same Congress that framed the First
Amendment, the Ordinance can be read as a sort of commentary on that
Amendment. This Note concludes that both arguments are false.
The purpose of Part I of this Note was to demonstrate that the
Ordinance does not violate any separationist construction of the First
Amendment. Contrary to the claims of many accommodationists, the
"religion, morality, and knowledge" clause was not intended to require or
allow federal aid to religion. First, the clause cannot grammatically be
construed to encourage religion. Second, historians and state judiciaries do
not view the clause as anything more than a prophetic statement of the
importance of education to "good government and the happiness of
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mankind." Third, the legislative history of the clause, and the Ordi-
nance's immediate legislative predecessors, suggest that the Congress of
the Confederation was reluctant to write support for religion into the
governing documents oftheNorthwest Territory. In fact, Congress stripped
the "religion, morality, and knowledge" clause of wording that would have
encouraged support for religion. Finally, this section explored aid to
religion in two large sales of land finalized after the passage of the
Ordinance and found that nothing in the Ordinance required such aid. This
section concluded that there is no evidence that the Ordinance violates
separationist expectations of the First Amendment.
Part II of this Note explored the claim that the Ordinance can be read
as a type of commentary on the First Amendment. The argument assumes
that the work of the First Congress in reenacting the Ordinance and framing
the text of the First Amendment overlapped to the point that the First
Congress could not have reenacted the Ordinance without understanding its
implications on the Establishment Clause. This section concluded that the
reenactment of the Ordinance and the framing of the Amendment were so
chronologically distinct that it would have been impossible for the First
Congress to have any real sense of the outlines of the First Amendment at
the time of the reenactment. Accordingly, it is impossible to see the
Ordinance as a commentary on the Establishment Clause.
In summary, there is no evidence that the Ordinance either substan-
tively violates the separationist understanding of the Establishment Clause,
or can be used to infer anything meaningful about the intentions of the First
Amendment. Neither of the primary accommodationist assumptions about
the Ordinance is true. Accordingly, the argument "should be frankly and
explicitly abandoned." ' 6
" Act to Provide for the Government of the Territory North-west of the River
Ohio, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 52 n.(a) (1789).
226 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Rehnquist is referring to Jefferson's "wall of separation" metaphor.
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